Journal entry to record tax benefit from employee exercises of stock options. Companies pay its employees using restricted stocks and stock options and the accounting treatment for both of them is very different. . The journal entries for these transactions are given below. entry. But TestCo will get a tax deduction for $ [ ($20 – $13) * shares ] when its CFO sells his shares.

Journal entry to record tax benefit from employee exercises of stock options

REVERSAL OF INPUT TAX CREDIT ADJUSTMENT ENTRY FOR DAMAGE GOODS IN TALLY PART-1

Journal entry to record tax benefit from employee exercises of stock options. Accordingly, companies recognize no tax benefit when they record the compensation expense under Statement no. (R). When a disqualifying disposition of an ISO occurs—when an employee disposes of the stock within two years of the option grant date or within one year of the option exercise.

Journal entry to record tax benefit from employee exercises of stock options


The time has come to end the debate on accounting for stock options; the controversy has been going on far too long. The rule specified that the cost of options at the grant date should be measured by their intrinsic value—the difference between the current fair market value of the stock and the exercise price of the option.

Under this method, no cost was assigned to options when their exercise price was set at the current market price. The rationale for the rule was fairly simple: Because no cash changes hands when the grant is made, issuing a stock option is not an economically significant transaction. APB 25 was obsolete within a year.

The publication in of the Black-Scholes formula triggered a huge boom in markets for publicly traded options, a movement reinforced by the opening, also in , of the Chicago Board Options Exchange. It was surely no coincidence that the growth of the traded options markets was mirrored by an increasing use of share option grants in executive and employee compensation.

The National Center for Employee Ownership estimates that nearly 10 million employees received stock options in ; fewer than 1 million did in It soon became clear in both theory and practice that options of any kind were worth far more than the intrinsic value defined by APB FASB initiated a review of stock option accounting in and, after more than a decade of heated controversy, finally issued SFAS in October It recommended—but did not require—companies to report the cost of options granted and to determine their fair market value using option-pricing models.

The new standard was a compromise, reflecting intense lobbying by businesspeople and politicians against mandatory reporting. Inevitably, most companies chose to ignore the recommendation that they opposed so vehemently and continued to record only the intrinsic value at grant date, typically zero, of their stock option grants. Subsequently, the extraordinary boom in share prices made critics of option expensing look like spoilsports.

But since the crash, the debate has returned with a vengeance. The spate of corporate accounting scandals in particular has revealed just how unreal a picture of their economic performance many companies have been painting in their financial statements. Increasingly, investors and regulators have come to recognize that option-based compensation is a major distorting factor.

We believe that the case for expensing options is overwhelming, and in the following pages we examine and dismiss the principal claims put forward by those who continue to oppose it.

We then discuss just how firms might go about reporting the cost of options on their income statements and balance sheets. It is a basic principle of accounting that financial statements should record economically significant transactions.

For many people, though, company stock option grants are a different story. These transactions are not economically significant, the argument goes, because no cash changes hands. That position defies economic logic, not to mention common sense, in several respects. For a start, transfers of value do not have to involve transfers of cash. While a transaction involving a cash receipt or payment is sufficient to generate a recordable transaction, it is not necessary.

Events such as exchanging stock for assets, signing a lease, providing future pension or vacation benefits for current-period employment, or acquiring materials on credit all trigger accounting transactions because they involve transfers of value, even though no cash changes hands at the time the transaction occurs.

Even if no cash changes hands, issuing stock options to employees incurs a sacrifice of cash, an opportunity cost, which needs to be accounted for.

It is exactly the same with stock options. When a company grants options to employees, it forgoes the opportunity to receive cash from underwriters who could take these same options and sell them in a competitive options market to investors.

Warren Buffett made this point graphically in an April 9, , Washington Post column when he stated: It can, of course, be more reasonably argued that the cash forgone by issuing options to employees, rather than selling them to investors, is offset by the cash the company conserves by paying its employees less cash.

As two widely respected economists, Burton G. Malkiel and William J. Baumol, noted in an April 4, , Wall Street Journal article: Instead, it can offer stock options. The following hypothetical illustration shows how that can happen. Imagine two companies, KapCorp and MerBod, competing in exactly the same line of business. The two differ only in the structure of their employee compensation packages.

Economically, the two positions are identical. How legitimate is an accounting standard that allows two economically identical transactions to produce radically different numbers?

MerBod will also seem to have a lower equity base than KapCorp, even though the increase in the number of shares outstanding will eventually be the same for both companies if all the options are exercised. This distortion is, of course, repeated every year that the two firms choose the different forms of compensation. Some opponents of option expensing defend their position on practical, not conceptual, grounds.

Option-pricing models may work, they say, as a guide for valuing publicly traded options. And for stock options, the absence of a liquid market has little effect on their value to the holder.

The great beauty of option-pricing models is that they are based on the characteristics of the underlying stock. The Black-Scholes price of an option equals the value of a portfolio of stock and cash that is managed dynamically to replicate the payoffs to that option. And that applies even if there were no market for trading the option directly. Investment banks, commercial banks, and insurance companies have now gone far beyond the basic, year-old Black-Scholes model to develop approaches to pricing all sorts of options: Options traded through intermediaries, over the counter, and on exchanges.

Options linked to currency fluctuations. Options embedded in complex securities such as convertible debt, preferred stock, or callable debt like mortgages with prepay features or interest rate caps and floors. A whole subindustry has developed to help individuals, companies, and money market managers buy and sell these complex securities.

Current financial technology certainly permits firms to incorporate all the features of employee stock options into a pricing model. But financial statements should strive to be approximately right in reflecting economic reality rather than precisely wrong.

Managers routinely rely on estimates for important cost items, such as the depreciation of plant and equipment and provisions against contingent liabilities, such as future environmental cleanups and settlements from product liability suits and other litigation. Not all the objections to using Black-Scholes and other option valuation models are based on difficulties in estimating the cost of options granted. Since almost all individuals are risk averse, we can expect employees to place substantially less value on their stock option package than other, better-diversified, investors would.

The existence of this deadweight cost is sometimes used to justify the apparently huge scale of option-based remuneration handed out to top executives. We would point out that this reasoning validates our earlier point that options are a substitute for cash. Financial statements reflect the economic perspective of the company, not the entities including employees with which it transacts. When a company sells a product to a customer, for example, it does not have to verify what the product is worth to that individual.

It counts the expected cash payment in the transaction as its revenue. The company records the purchase price as the cash or cash equivalent it sacrificed to acquire the good or service. Suppose a clothing manufacturer were to build a fitness center for its employees. The company would not do so to compete with fitness clubs.

It would build the center to generate higher revenues from increased productivity and creativity of healthier, happier employees and to reduce costs arising from employee turnover and illness. The cost to the company is clearly the cost of building and maintaining the facility, not the value that the individual employees might place on it. The cost of the fitness center is recorded as a periodic expense, loosely matched to the expected revenue increase and reductions in employee-related costs.

While we agree with the basic logic of this argument, the impact of forfeiture and early exercise on theoretical values may be grossly exaggerated. Unlike cash salary, stock options cannot be transferred from the individual granted them to anyone else. Nontransferability has two effects that combine to make employee options less valuable than conventional options traded in the market. First, employees forfeit their options if they leave the company before the options have vested.

Second, employees tend to reduce their risk by exercising vested stock options much earlier than a well-diversified investor would, thereby reducing the potential for a much higher payoff had they held the options to maturity. Employees with vested options that are in the money will also exercise them when they quit, since most companies require employees to use or lose their options upon departure.

Recognizing the increasing probability that companies will be required to expense stock options, some opponents are fighting a rearguard action by trying to persuade standard setters to significantly reduce the reported cost of those options, discounting their value from that measured by financial models to reflect the strong likelihood of forfeiture and early exercise.

Current proposals put forth by these people to FASB and IASB would allow companies to estimate the percentage of options forfeited during the vesting period and reduce the cost of option grants by this amount. Also, rather than use the expiration date for the option life in an option-pricing model, the proposals seek to allow companies to use an expected life for the option to reflect the likelihood of early exercise.

Using an expected life which companies may estimate at close to the vesting period, say, four years instead of the contractual period of, say, ten years, would significantly reduce the estimated cost of the option. Some adjustment should be made for forfeiture and early exercise. But the proposed method significantly overstates the cost reduction since it neglects the circumstances under which options are most likely to be forfeited or exercised early.

When these circumstances are taken into account, the reduction in employee option costs is likely to be much smaller. Using a flat percentage for forfeitures based on historical or prospective employee turnover is valid only if forfeiture is a random event, like a lottery, independent of the stock price.

In reality, however, the likelihood of forfeiture is negatively related to the value of the options forfeited and, hence, to the stock price itself. People are more likely to leave a company and forfeit options when the stock price has declined and the options are worth little. But if the firm has done well and the stock price has increased significantly since grant date, the options will have become much more valuable, and employees will be much less likely to leave. The argument for early exercise is similar.

It also depends on the future stock price. Senior executives, however, with the largest option holdings, are unlikely to exercise early and destroy option value when the stock price has risen substantially.

Often they own unrestricted stock, which they can sell as a more efficient means to reduce their risk exposure. Or they have enough at stake to contract with an investment bank to hedge their option positions without exercising prematurely.

As with the forfeiture feature, the calculation of an expected option life without regard to the magnitude of the holdings of employees who exercise early, or to their ability to hedge their risk through other means, would significantly underestimate the cost of options granted. The adjustments, properly assessed, could turn out to be significantly smaller than the proposed calculations apparently endorsed by FASB and IASB would produce.

Another argument in defense of the existing approach is that companies already disclose information about the cost of option grants in the footnotes to the financial statements. Investors and analysts who wish to adjust income statements for the cost of options, therefore, have the necessary data readily available. We find that argument hard to swallow. Relegating an item of such major economic significance as employee option grants to the footnotes would systematically distort those reports.

But even if we were to accept the principle that footnote disclosure is sufficient, in reality we would find it a poor substitute for recognizing the expense directly on the primary statements.


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